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Sustainability has become a hot issue globally and renewable energy sources 
are among the most important themes of sustainability research. Despite this 
trend, there are a few marketing papers addressing the renewable energy topic. 
To fill this gap, I study the diffusion of solar photovoltaic (PV) panels among 
households. More specifically I investigate why different households adopt at 
different points in time and how uncertainty affects their decisions. I use 
micromodeling approach to shed light on the underlying adoption mechanisms. 
I model solar panel adoption by forward looking households (or electricity 
producers in this context) as an investment decision in a technology with 
uncertain payoff. Using the visibility of rooftop solar PV panels from outside, 
I incorporate observational learning as the mechanism for information 
spillover across time and across households. I estimate the model using a 
unique household-level data set on the adoption timings of the solar PV panels 
in Germany. The estimation of parameters enables me to perform 
counterfactual policy experiments on the incentive instruments aimed at 
accelerating the diffusion process. I demonstrate that by leveraging the 
observational learning phenomenon, policy makers can adjust the timing of 
the incentive policies in order to maximize the diffusion of solar PV panels. 
The proposed framework can be adapted to other sustainable technologies and 
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Sustainability has become a hot issue globally, and renewable energy sources 
are among the most important topics of sustainability research. During the past 
two decades there has been a big movement among different countries to 
support the adoption of renewable energy on a small scale (i.e. among 
households). This might result in the creation of a huge potential market for 
renewable energy sources which would ultimately replace conventional energy 
sources. Despite the importance and significance of this trend, the adoption of 
renewable energy has not been sufficiently studied in the marketing literature1. 
Looking at the diffusion pattern of solar PV (Photovoltaic) panels, it is 
important to understand why different households adopt at different points in 
time. Investigating the adoption dynamics can help answering this research 
question. The insights generated when applied to the policy experiments can 
have important implications for policy makers in the renewable energy field.   
  In this dissertation I aim to fill the gap in the marketing literature by 
studying the adoption of renewable energy. I take the consumers’ perspective 
to study the diffusion of solar photovoltaic (PV) panels among households. 
More specifically I investigate what drives the temporal distribution of 
residential solar PV panels and why different households adopt at different 
points in time2. My structural model captures the investment aspect of the 
                                                            
1 A recent Economist article points to the same phenomenon in the business literature: 
http://www.economist.com/whichmba/making-climate-change-one’s-business 
2 Since our data set only covers the households who have adopted solar panels, the 
focus of our study is on the adoption timing decisions (i.e. adoption now or delay) 




adoption decisions in an uncertain environment; in other words, I treat 
households as forward-looking producers of electricity who decide to invest in 
solar PV panels with uncertain payoff.  Using the visibility of solar panels 
from outside, I model observational learning as the mechanism to reduce the 
inherent uncertainty in the adoption payoff. I estimate the model using a 
unique individual-level data on the adoption timings of the solar panels in 
Germany. The estimation of parameters enables me to perform policy 
experiments on the role of incentive policy instruments in accelerating the 




Studying the diffusion of solar PV panels is both important and complex. It 
crosses over different streams of research in economics and marketing. These 
broad areas include new technology diffusion models, durable goods adoption 
models, learning models, and renewable energy policy.   In this section I 
briefly discuss the relevant literature in each area and their interrelatedness. 
2-1- Diffusion models of new products 
 
Traditionally marketing researchers have been interested in modeling the 
diffusion of new products. Stemming from the seminal Bass model, Bass 
(1969), different aggregate models have been suggested to explain the 
adoption pattern of the new products as the function of the previous adopters, 
innovativeness of the adopters, and marketing variables (e.g. Generalized Bass 
model of Bass et. al. (1994) ). While these models could forecast the adoption 
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pattern well, the lack of theoretical foundations and their aggregate approach 
make them unsuitable for explaining the underlying mechanisms behind the 
diffusion pattern. Aggregate diffusion models assume that the population is 
homogenous and that only stochastic forces affect the spread of adoption 
timings. Thus they may not capture the underlying behaviors by 
heterogeneous customers such as learning. As such, they may not be very 
suitable for policy experiments.  
 
2-2- Micromodels of Durable Goods Adoption  
 
With the goal shedding more lights on the adoption process, marketing 
researchers have tried to use the micromodeling frameworks. The early 
theoretical works by Horsky (1990) and Catterjee and Eliashberg (1990) have 
built individual-level utility maximization as the foundation of the new 
product diffusion. In Horsky (1990), the diffusion curve is generated from 
individuals’ utility maximization over the household’s production function of 
all the commodities. It is then aggregated by assuming that the income follows 
extreme value distribution across the population. He incorporates uncertainty 
while not using the conventional Bayesian learning framework. By estimating 
an aggregate model, he shows that both income heterogeneity and uncertainty 
can affect the diffusion pattern. Chatterjee and Eliashberg (1990) propose a 
utility maximization framework allowing for heterogeneity in the preferences 
and beliefs of adopters. Their model incorporates the Bayesian learning 
mechanism with risk aversion to construct different aggregate diffusion curves. 
They demonstrate via a pilot survey-based estimation procedure that utility 
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maximization and learning are important in affecting the aggregate diffusion 
pattern.  Their model may not be easily applicable to estimating the typical 
individual-level adoption data used in the literature.  
Continuing this trend, several structural models have been proposed in 
the literature ever since, to provide deeper insights into the durable goods 
diffusion process.  Forward-looking behavior is an important aspect in the 
adoption of durable goods where quality improves and price falls over time.  
Melinkov (2000) and Song and Chintagunta (2003) are among the earliest 
papers bringing forward-looking behavior to the micromodels of diffusion. 
Melinkov (2000) proposes a dynamic model of computer printer adoption 
incorporating the expectation over the future quality. The setting is an optimal 
stopping problem for when to buy (e.g. hazard model) decisions. The 
estimation is done on aggregate sales data of the U.S. computer printer market. 
He shows that forward-looking is an important aspect in estimating 
micromodels of new durable products. Song and Chintagunta (2003)’s model 
is similar except for the built-in heterogeneity for both price and preference 
parameters. They estimate the model using aggregate data on the digital 
camera category in the U.S. market. Their model can generate flexible 
aggregate diffusion patterns incorporating heterogeneity and forward-looking.  
Despite having the micromodeling foundation, these two models are tailored 
for aggregate-level estimation. In other words, these models are estimated at 
the aggregate level and are unable to capture the dynamics in individuals’ 
behavior, like learning and information spillover. Thus they may not provide 
the best means for policy experiments in markets where uncertainty and 
learning play salient roles.  
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Another interesting paper to note is Yang and Ching (2013). They 
study the adoption of ATM cards by building a micromodel with dynamic 
usage optimization and static adoption decision. They benefit from a rich 
individual level data plus the cash withdrawal patterns before and after 
adoption. In their model, heterogeneity comes from age which affects the life 
horizon of individuals and therefore the total discounted adoption benefits they 
get. They are able to demonstrate why elderly have lower adoption rates. Their 
model does not incorporate any form of uncertainty into the adoption 
decisions.  
2-3- Learning Models 
 
In adopting products or services, there are usually uncertainties involved. They 
may be quality uncertainty (either because of quality variation or match 
uncertainty), actual cost uncertainty (uncertainty regarding the cost and 
benefits over the long term), and usage uncertainty (over subscribing to mobile 
phone plans). Modeling uncertainty and learning in new technology diffusion 
is the focus of an extant body of literature. The early decision-theoretic paper 
by Jensen (1982), and subsequent papers like McCardle (1985)3,  have 
proposed individual-level new technology adoption models incorporating 
uncertainty into the diffusion framework. While these models do a good job in 
behaviorally explaining the diffusion curve, they are ill-suited for empirical 
applications.  
Roberts and Urban (1988) is among the first empirical papers in 
marketing that model uncertainty and learning in the adoption of durable 
                                                            
3 Some recent papers in operations research literature have started tackling this 
problem (e.g. Ulu and Smith (2009)).  
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goods. The authors propose a model and utilize individual-level survey data to 
estimate the effect of attribute uncertainty on automobile brand choice 
decisions. Since then, there have been proposed various Bayesian learning 
papers modeling quality uncertainty (e.g. Erdem et al. (2005) utilize panel 
surveys to study the active information searching in choosing between 
different brands of personal computers). Since there is no repeat purchase, 
these models have mainly used survey data and have focused on individual 
learning, where private signals are the source of information.  
 In a similar vein, observational learning models study the setting 
where observing the adoption decisions of others is the source of information. 
Since actions reflect underlying beliefs, they give the attentive observer the 
ability to infer those beliefs via private signals. Thus the public will gradually 
converge in their actions (right or wrong) such that individuals neglect their 
private signals and only look at the predecessors actions. This phenomenon is 
called “Information Cascade”. The seminal theoretical papers in this field are 
Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992). So far, different variations of 
the classic observational learning models have emerged in the literature with 
the goal of making the settings more general (e.g. Rational observational 
learning introduced in Eyster and Rabin (2011)).  
There have been a few empirical papers in economic journals on the 
adoption of durable goods in the presence of observational and social learning. 
Grinblatt et.al (2008) is among the early papers studying the role of social 
learning in the adoption of automobiles4. It leverages the unique data of the 
                                                            




location of individual households and their purchase decisions in Finland. 
Individual-level choice model with the car purchases in the near proximity as 
the independent variable of interest. It establishes that the purchase history of 
the close neighbors affects the purchase of automobile by the focal consumer5 
while does not tackle the process behind this phenomenon. The other 
interesting paper to be mentioned is Conley and Udry (2010) that studies the 
impact of social learning on the adoption of new agricultural technology. It 
utilizes a unique dataset of the pineapple farmers in Ghana and their adoption 
of new fertilizers. The data allows the researchers to define the information 
reference groups of each farmer and to establish the sequence of information 
one receives on the performance of fertilizers used by peers. By assuming that 
the focal farmer can observe the performance of new technologies by others, 
the setting resembles information sharing (where one observes the outcome 
and the reasons behind it) as compared to observational learning (in which one 
doesn’t know the reasons behind adoption).   
It has taken some time for the marketing research scholars to study this 
established phenomenon. Zhang (2010) is a recent interesting paper with 
empirical model of observational learning. She studies the acceptance of 
kidneys for transplant in the U.S. market. In her paper, the perceived quality of 
kidney is influenced by number of refusals earlier in the waiting list. She uses 
a unique individual-level data of the sequence of decisions by patients in 
different queues allowing a clear formulation of observational learning. She 
assumes that each patient knows the preferences of its peers in the waiting list 
and thus shows that earlier rejections negatively affect the quality perception 
                                                            




for the focal patient. The unique setting (i.e. where learning is only from the 
past non-adopters) and the assumptions taken (i.e. one knows the preference 
distribution of others) make it difficult for the adoption model to be applied to 
the typical new products. There have been attempts to use novel settings to 
study the social influence on the adoption of durable goods. Narayan et. Al. 
(2011) construct a conjoint experiment to investigate the peer influence on the 
adoption of E-book readers and mobile phones. Contrary to the conventional 
models where learning is on quality or other product attributes, they show that 
social learning can also affect the attribute weights.  In general the lack of 
proper individual-level data (i.e. to allow for a clean construction of 
observational learning) and difficulty in defining quality perception (i.e. 
quality is subjective and hard to model in most contexts) are among the main 
reasons that we have not seen substantial similar models for the adoption of 
durable goods. 
Table 1 shows an overview of the micromodelds of durable goods 
adoption in marketing literature. Since I use the same methodological 








Table 1 - Micromodels of Durable Goods Adoption 
Model Context Individual Level Panel Data Forward Looking Individual Learning Observational Learning 
Roberts and Urban 
(1988) Automobile models      
Horsky (1990) Appliances      
Chatterjee and 
Eliashberg (1990) 
Career counselling  
software      
Song and 
Chintagunta (2003) Digital camera      
Erdem et. al. (2005) PC    *    
Gordon (2009) CPU (Adoption/Replacement)      
Heutel and 
Muehlegger (2010) Hybrid vehicle      
Yang and Ching 
(2013) ATM cards      
My model Solar PV panels (Investment)      
* They have used a survey in which respondents were asked explicitly how they search and gather information. 
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2-4- Diffusion models of sustainable technologies 
 
Only recently a new trend has been started to study the adoption of renewable 
energy from a marketing perspective. Somehow similar to the topic of this 
thesis, Bollinger and Gillingham (2010) look at the significance of peer 
influence in the spatial diffusion of solar panels in California. They use an 
aggregate hazard model at street level and focus on a quasi-experimental 
approach to identify the peer effects. They could show the positive influence 
of previous adoptions on the decision to adopt at the street level which results 
in clustering. While they control for neighborhood demographics, time trend, 
and cumulative number of installations, they do not structurally construct the 
adoption utility. The reduced form of the model can show the peer effects on 
adoption but not the mechanism through which it works6 and therefor it can’t 
be used for policy experiments.  
Heutel and Muehlegger (2010) use an individual-level model to study 
the consumer learning phenomenon in hybrid vehicle adoption. They focus on 
model-specific quality learning using aggregate sales data (they had to make 
assumptions to handle learning with aggregate data). They show that model-
specific learning is effective and can be either positive or negative. Shriver 
(2010) uses a full structural model of both demand and supply in a two-sided 
market setting (the automobile as the platform for consumers and fuel retailers) 
to study the role of network effects on ethanol fuel adoption. He uses zip code-
level data to estimate the demand parameters in a BLP-style model (as in 
Berry et al. (1995)). He shows that the network effect of the ethanol retailer 





studies had to deal with the aggregate nature of the data used for estimation. 
The aggregate estimation doesn’t allow the proper heterogeneity incorporation 
which may results in biased estimates.  Moreover, it doesn’t allow to explicitly 
modeling the uncertainty and the process through which it gets resolved 
during the diffusion process.  
 
2-5- Solar PV case 
 
Solar PV panels can be considered durable goods since they are one-time 
adoptions (with long operating life) and they experience rapid improvement in 
performance and decline in price over time. As in the case of durable goods, 
consumers form expectation about the trends of price and performance before 
they decide to adopt or wait depending option value of waiting. This makes it 
necessary to incorporate the dynamics of forward-looking behavior into the 
adoption model.   
Unlike most of the durable goods studied in the extant literature, solar 
PV panels do not bring any additional functionality (utility) to the adopters, 
but merely replace the conventional non-renewable electricity sources. Under 
the Feed-in Tariff scheme7, the electricity generated by solar panels will be fed 
into the grid at a rate higher than the one household buys conventional 
electricity from the grid8. Thus the adoption decision can be intuitively viewed 
                                                            
7 Among the incentive policies used by the policy makers around the world, Feed-in 
Tariff (FIT) has gained more attention especially in the case of solar PV panels. This 
is contract based with long horizon in European countries (e.g. 20 years fixed Feed-In 
Tariff contract in Germany). Please refer to the Appendix 1 for the brief introduction 
and historical account on the Feed-in Tariff policy in Germany. 
8 Here we assume that the electricity consumption would be the same regardless of 
adopting solar panels. In this case, the adopters pay for the fixed cost of the solar 
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as an investment decision (i.e. households acts as electricity producers who 
decide to invest in a new technology).  
In this setting, there would be no perfect information regarding the 
actual electricity output of the installed solar panel in future (i.e. it can be a 
function of weather and many other factors) and thus the payoff of the 
investment beforehand. As the result, uncertainty is an important factor to be 
accounted for. Specifically in the case of rooftop solar PV panels, the panels 
are installed on the roofs and can be visible from the outside. Therefor it can 
be safely assumed that the adoption decisions are observable by others 
immediately after installation. This makes the adoption of solar panels a 
suitable context to study the role of observational learning on the durable 
goods adoption. This can have important implications for the types of 
information spillover in the solar PV panel market.  
The above mentioned features add to the merits of studying the 
adoption of solar PV panels from the methodological standpoint. I build on 
micromodels of durable goods adoption to study the adoption of solar panels 
by forward-looking households.  I incorporate the investment nature of 
adoption, the option value of waiting, the uncertainty of the adoption payoff, 
and the visibility of adoptions as the distinguishing features of my model. I 
contribute to the durable goods literature by customizing a dynamic individual 
level model suitable for uncertain investment scenarios and accounting for 
cross-individual information spillover. The specific context and the unique 
                                                                                                                                                           
system and will receive stream of revenues by feeding the generated electricity to the 
grid in the future.  
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individual level solar PV adoption dataset allow us to avoid the limitations 
faced in the extant diffusion literature.   
In the following sections I elaborate on the proposed model and the 
dataset used. I will then continue by discussing of the estimation procedure 




The utility of adopting solar panels for household i at time t is a function of 
benefits Q୧୲ and cost  p୧୲  of investing in solar energy. I use a general indirect 
utility specification: 
U୧୲ ൌ ߙ݅ ൅	ߠ௜ሺQ୧୲ െ	p୧୲ሻ ൅ ߝ௜௧                                                        (1)                                            
ߝ௜௧ is IID an additive random shock to the utility which follows the standard 
normal distribution. ߙ௜  is the base utility of adoption (it is a function of 
neighborhood-level demographics), θ୧ is the propensity to the net financial 
benefits derived from adopting the solar panel (it is a function of 
neighborhood-level demographics), Q୧୲ is the potential benefits of adoption 
which is basically equals the average payoff  PVన୲തതതതത  of investment9. However, 
since solar PV panel is a new technology and the future income stream (i.e. the 
stream of revenues from selling the solar-generated electricity to the grid 
                                                            
9 I assume the life of the solar panel to be 20 years and the average annual electricity 
yield of the panel to be 1000 KWh per 1KWp (to be multiplied by FIT of the 
installation year). The discount rate of 0.95 is assumed for calculating the payoff of 
the income stream in the next 20 years. 
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based on the federal Feed-In Tariff rate over the life of the panels)10 depends 
on many unknown factors at the point of adoption (weather in the long run, 
quality of the panel in the long run, etc.), the households will have some 
uncertainty as to if they will fully receive the benefits or not. I call this 
uncertainty as ‘belief about investment payoff’, q୧୲, which is assumed to be 
between zero and one11. Therefore, I modify equation (1) as follows: 
U୧୲ ൌ ߙ݅ ൅	θ௜ሺ	ܲ పܸ௧തതതതതݍ௜௧ െ	p୧୲ሻ ൅ ߝ௜௧                                                  (2)                                   
In the extant marketing literature, consumers are usually considered to be 
forward looking with respect to the adoption of the new technology. The 
utility of not adopting at time t, U଴୲, is the value12 that household i would get if 
he forgoes adopting now but keeps the option of adoption in the future periods. 
Since one does not have the perfect information about the future market, 
household i forms expectation over the value she gets in the next period. 
Therefore we have:  
U୧୲଴ ൌ β ∗ Eሺ ௜ܸ௧ାଵ| ௜ܵ௧ሻ                                                                              (3)                                     
where Eሺ ௜ܸ௧ାଵ| ௜ܵ௧ሻ is the expectation of the value function in t+1 given the 
current state13  ௜ܵ௧ and β is the discount factor.  
                                                            
10 I can also make the payoff net of the risk-free interests from investing Pit in bank 
deposits. I have run trial estimation and found that it doesn’t improve the estimates 
much.   
11 This uncertainty is different from the discount rate that one may use. Discount rate 
is known to the investor while the belief about the investment payoff is a function of 
the information one has prior to the investment.  
12 In the dynamic programing context, value (or value function) captures the utility 
one gains if he acts optimally given the state of the world.  
13 In the dynamic programing context, state (or state variables) encapsulates all the 
information one needs to know about the state of the world at time t.  
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I further assume that initially all the households have a common 
knowledge about the realization of investment payoff, q୧୲, although no one 
would know the true payoff. Each places faith on her belief. The initial belief 
for household i is:  
q୧୲ሺt ൌ 0ሻ	~Nሺω଴	, σ଴ଶሻ                                                                             (4)                                  
where ω଴ is the mean of initial belief and σ଴ଶ is its standard deviation14.  
Companies marketing the product would be contacting the potential 
customers through mass media, direct mails and telephones and trying to 
convince customers on the product quality or the potential income stream in 
the solar PV case using scientific reports that support their claims. I assume 
that the signals received by the individual households follow normal 
distribution around the true q  (unknown to the households): 
ߣଵ௜ ~Nሺq	, σୱଶ )                                                                                     (5)                           
where q is the true realization (between 0 and 1) of investment payoff and σୱଶ 
is the noise associated with the signal. The private signals received by each 
household are15: 
λଵଵ,		λଵଶ, λଵଷ, … , λଵ୧ , …                                                                           (6)                           
Combining the initial common belief with the private signal, each 
household updates its belief in a Bayesian fashion as follows: 
                                                            
14 In the learning models literature, for the ease of estimation, usually  ω଴ is assumed 
to be zero and σ଴ଶ is set to be 1. I have estimated ω଴ in trial estimation and the value 
turned out to be almost zero. 
15 Each household only observes her signal and not others’ signals; otherwise they 













where ωଵ୧  is the posterior belief of the true realization and σଵ୧ଶ is the posterior 
variance of the belief. Acting on the posterior belief, each household decides 
whether to adopt the solar panel or not. I assume the households to be risk 
neutral (i.e. maximizing expected value) which means:  
൞




Given the normality assumption for the random shock, the probability of 
adoption by household i at t=1 would be16:  
1 െ CDF	 ቀെߙ݅ ൅ θ௜ ∗ p୧ଵ െ θ௜	ܲ పܸଵതതതതതതωଵ୧ ൅ β ∗ Eሺ ௜ܸଶ| ௜ܵଵሻቁ								        (9)                                        
In the conventional learning models like Erdem and Keane (1996), it is 
assumed that there would be incoming signals in the subsequent periods (i.e. 
each time a consumer experiences a product) and in each period consumers 
update their beliefs according to (7) and make adoption decisions according to 
(8). Since my model is about the adoption of a new durable product, there will 
be no such product experience signal to influence the beliefs (i.e. my model is 
different from the conventional Bayesian learning models in a sense).  
Further, I assume that no new information is made available by the 
companies or acquired by the households in the subsequent periods, in effect 
implying that there are no more private signals after the initial period. 
                                                            
16 Each household knows its utility with certainty. From outsider’s point of view (e.g. 
neighbors), it is a random variable. 
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However, an important aspect of deciding to adopt a new technology is 
learning from others. In the solar PV case, households can observe the 
adoption of rooftop solar panels by other households in the neighborhood and 
use that information to infer about the investment payoff. Although I do not 
have data on the actual word of mouth (i.e. consumers share their private 
signals to each other), the mere observation of other households’ adoption in 
the same neighborhood can reveal something about the investment payoff. I 
hence incorporate observational learning (i.e. inferring private signals from 
observing the actions of others) in my proposed model. This observation is a 
source of probabilistic inference because the observed number of adoptions in 
the neighborhood is just one of many possible outcomes and the focal 
household may never know the reasoning behind the adoptions by others. 
Further, as long as the household has not adopted the product, she would keep 
updating her belief every period via observation. I model this process as 
follows. 
Representing the neighborhood17 as consisting of homogenous 
consumers, the average household’s utility of adoption at time t in 
neighborhood k is given by: 
ߙ௞ ൅	θ݇൫	ܸܲ݇ݐതതതതതߛ݇ݐ െ 	pkt൯ ൅ ߝ݇ݐ                                                (10)                       
This is very similar to equation (2) but operates at the average household at the 
neighborhood level18. The average household is expected to adopt if the utility 
                                                            
17 I use street segment vicinity as the neighborhood where each street has a unique 
code. 
18 ߙ௞  and θ௞are the same for all since they are function of neighborhood 




of adopting is greater than zero. Here ߛ௞௧ 19 is the mean belief across the 
neighborhood k in time t while the standard deviation is assumed to be  σ୲ଶ. 
The standard deviation is same as that of the quality signal received from the 
company (i.e. as in (5)) for the reason that the market level belief will be 
reflecting the underlying uncertainty of the signal generating source. Since a 
household observes the fraction of households adopting the solar PV panels in 
its neighborhood out of those who have not adopted yet, she can make an 
inference. Using (9) and by using the probability of adoption and acceptance 
rate in neighborhood k interchangeably, we’ll have20: 
ߛ௞௧ ൌ
ሺ൫ܫ݊ݒ݁ݎݏ݁ܥܦܨ൫ܣܿܿ݁݌ݐܴܽ݊ܿ݁ܽݐ݁෣ ௞,௧ିଵ൯ െ ߙ݇ ൅ θ௞ ∗ p୩୲ିଵ൯ሻ
θ௞ ∗ 	ܲ ௞ܸ௧ିଵതതതതതതതതത൘                                    
                                                                                                                 (11)                              
This defines the payoff inference a household in neighborhood k will be 
getting by observing others’ adoption decisions. This will be same for all the 
households in neighborhood k21.  
Note that since at t=1 (before realization of the adoption decisions in each 
neighborhood) there was no observation.  To initialize the process I assume 
that the household i has a prior belief about the proportion of households in its 
                                                            
19 The mean belief, γ୩୲, is time variant and captures the belief at the neighborhood 
level about the investment payoff. In other words, ߛ௞௧ is what one infers about the 
investment payoff by observing the adoption pattern at neighborhood k at time t.  
20 The proof is given in Appendix 3. 
21 Note that γ୩୲ is the inference taking place in time t by observing the adoption 
pattern in the neighborhood in t-1. 
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neighborhood that would adopt (i.e. acceptance rate). This prior belief is 
assumed to stem from a beta distribution22:  
	ሺܣܿܿ݁݌ݐܽ݊ܿ݁	ܴܽݐ݁	ܤ݈݁݅݁ ଵ݂|ܰ݋	ܱܾݏ݁ݎݒܽݐ݅݋݊ሻ~ܤ݁ݐܽሺΑ1	, Β1ሻ     (12)                                      
For tractability, I assume that households don’t have any knowledge (i.e. 
ignorance) of the proportion of adopters beforehand which can be modeled by 
choosing (1,1) as priors for Αଵ and  Βଵ23.             
At the end of period one, the decisions of all households in the 
neighborhood k become realized (in total N1k adoptions out of M1k households 
in neighborhood k). Observing this, household i updates its belief regarding 
the acceptance rate in its neighborhood. 
൫ܣܿܿ݁݌ݐܽ݊ܿ݁	ܴܽݐ݁	ܤ݈݁݅݁ ଵ݂|ܯଵ௞, ଵܰ௞ሻ~ܤ݁ݐܽሺα1 ൅ N1݇	, β1 ൅ M1݇ െ N1݇൯	    
                                                                                                                      (13) 
As noted above (equation 11), there is a one to one correspondence 
between the acceptance rate and the quality inference. Thus household i 
combines her prior belief with this new signal from the market (mean quality 
inference from observation as in 11) to arrive at her posterior belief in t=2  and 
afterwards. 
                                                            
22 Beta distribution is chosen for its range (between 0 and 1) which makes it suitable 
for the proportion (i.e. acceptance rate) and also its conjugacy with 
Bernoulli/Binomial observations (i.e. adoption proportion observations).  
23 Alternatively, I can use the adoption proportion in different neighborhoods before 
t=1 to exogenously define the priors Αଵ and  Βଵ (i.e. I need to equate the historic 
















It can be seen from (14) that the effect of observing others’ behavior (at the 
neighborhood level) has been incorporated into the learning model.  
Given the posterior belief, household i decides to adopt or not depends on: 
ە
۔
ۓadopt	if:	ߙ݅ ൅	θ௜൫	ܲ పܸଶതതതതതതωଶ୧ െ	p୧ଶ൯ ൅ ߝ௜ଶ 	൒ β ∗ Eሺ ௜ܸଷ| ௜ܵଶሻ													
																				
݀݋݊ᇱݐܽ݀݋݌ݐ: ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁																																																																									
(15)                    
Those households who have not adopted till time t would go through the same 
process.  
       I need to solve for the value function before I can proceed with the 
likelihood function. The adoption decision depends on the price and payoff of 
investment (observable states) as well as the belief about the quality and the 
random shock (unobservable states). For the new technologies, the price falls 
down dramatically over time and usually consumers form rational expectation 
over the price in future before deciding to adopt or not. This makes the 
dynamic problem non-stationary (or time dependent). The adoption of solar 
panels is a one-time investment (i.e. if you adopt the solar panel there is a little 
chance you repeat the same adoption in the near future) which makes the 
dynamic problem similar to the optimal stopping problems. Therefor I can cast 
the solar panel adoption into the finite horizon optimal stopping problem. 
Following the extant literature on this methodology (e.g. Pakes (1986), 
Eckstein and Wolpin (1989)), I solve for the value function at each time and 
for each household using the backward induction algorithm starting from the 
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terminal period T24. I assume that each household forms rational expectation 
over price and payoff given all the historic data points up to t (this makes the 
expectations time specific which seems intuitive). Moreover, I assume that the 
future quality belief (ω୲୧) is expected to be the same given the unobserved 
nature of it. Lastly, I use the conditional independence assumption for random 
shocks to make the individual-level backward induction algorithm tractable.  
Having solved for the value function in (15), I can construct the likelihood 
function for household i as follows: 
ܮ݈݄݅݇݁݅݋݋݀௜ ൌ ∏ ቀቂ1 െ CDF	 ቀെߙ݅ ൅ θ௜ ∗ p୧୲ െ θ௜	ܲ పܸ௧തതതതതω୲୧ ൅ β ∗௧்ୀଵ
Eሺ ௜ܸ௧ାଵ| ௜ܵ௧ሻቁቃ ∗ ܣ݀݋݌ݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൅ ቂCDF	 ቀെߙ݅ ൅ θ௜ ∗ p୧୲ െ θ௜	ܲ పܸ௧തതതതതω୲୧ ൅ β ∗
Eሺ ௜ܸ௧ାଵ| ௜ܵ௧ሻቁቃ ∗ ܰ݋݊_ܣ݀݋݌ݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ቁ                                            (16)                                                 
Where 1-CDF(…) is the probability of adoption given in (9) and therefor 
CDF(…) is probability of not adopting. ܣ݀݋݌ݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ and ܰ݋݊_ܣ݀݋݌ݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ (i.e. 
adopt later) are dummy variables for adoption and not adoption respectively; 
their sum is 1 at each time.  
I take the log of the ܮ݈݄݅݇݁݅݋݋݀௜ to get ݈݋݃ܮ݈݄݅݇݁݅݋݋݀௜. This way the product 
term in (16) (i.e. ∏ …௧்ୀଵ ) will become the summation (i.e.  ∑ …௡்௧ୀଵ ) which is 
easier to handle. By summing over the log likelihood of each household, I will 
have the total log likelihood.  Minimizing the total log likelihood, I can 
                                                            
24 We assume T to be 10 years ahead of time t. Given the rapid changes in the solar 
photovoltaic technology, having a very far terminal period would make little sense.  
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estimate the model parameters (q	, σୱଶ, ߙ, ߠ)25 using Simulated Maximum 




I utilize a unique dataset on adoption timings of the residential solar PV panels 
in Germany. The sizes of the residential solar panel systems are equal to or 
less than 10 KWp26. The data covers nine years, from 2002-2010, and I 
consider each year as a discrete time unit. In total there are over 11000 
adopters. Table 2 shows the distribution of adoptions as well as market 
statistics across the nine years27: 
  






Feed in Tariff 
(€/KWh) 
 2002  584  6.09  5100  0.48 
 2003  563  6.18  4900  0.46 
 2004  923  6.24  5800  0.574 
 2005  1276  6.31  5400  0.54 
 2006  844  6.35  5100  0.52 
 2007  884  6.41  4400  0.49 
                                                            
25 q	, σୱଶ are not shown in the likelihood function but they are the essential part of the 
process generating ω୲୧  as in (6), (7), and (14). They are treated as parameters and get 
estimated. Also to be noted that I assume  ߚ ൌ 0.95, ߱଴ ൌ 0, and  ߪ଴ଶ ൌ 1  due to the 
lack of data for identification; this is a common practice in the marketing literature. 
26 This is the conventional definition of residential solar PV installations. 
27 The number of adoption and the average panel sizes in each year are calculated 
from the adoption dataset. The values of price and Feed-in Tariff are taken from the 














 2008  1488  6.47  4260  0.46 
 2009  2082  6.54  3500  0.43 
 2010  2402  6.51  2800  0.39 
  
As can be seen from Table 2, the average size of the installed panels 
increases over time. On the other hand, as with other new technologies, the 
price decreases substantially over time. Having the information on price and 
Feed in Tariff rate, we can calculate the net present value (NPV) of investing 
in 1KWp solar PV panel from 2002 to 201028. The following figure shows the 
trend of the number of solar panel adoptions in each year contrasted against 











28 The NPV is calculated for 1KWp unit. We assume the life of the solar panel to be 
20 years and the average annual electricity yield of the panel to be 1000 KWh per 
1KWp. The discount rate of 0.95 is assumed. 
Figure 1 - Number of Adopters vs NPV of Investing Solar PV over Time 
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solar PV panels), tell us that social learning is playing role in adoption of solar 
PV panels and thus it should be incorporated into the model.  
Furthermore we can see form figure 2 that the adoption centers29 are 
shifting over time. This suggests that the demographics of early and late 
adopters are not necessarily similar and thus it might be important to account 
for the observed heterogeneity in modeling the diffusion process. To this end, 
I further supplement the adoption timings data with the rich demographics 
information of the households at the neighborhood level (there are 7338 
neighborhoods in my sample). For each neighborhood I know the average 
income, proportion of singles and married (with and without children), 
proportion of residential and commercial buildings. Moreover using consumer 
lifestyle segmentation, I augment the neighborhood demographics with the 
percentage of households with different lifestyle30. Table 3 shows the 
summary statistics and definition of the demographic variables used in my 
analysis. 
  
Table 3 - Demographics Summary Statistics 
Variable Explanation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Average net income (€/10000) Average monthly 
income 
0.34 0.16 




Proportion of married families  0.36 0.18 
                                                            
29 A different color is used for the adoptions in each year while the size of circles 
shows the density of adoptions in each location. 
30 These include the percentage of households in each neighborhood belonging to a 









Proportion of residential building  0.74 0.17 




Proportion of Settled* Looking for peace and 
harmony 
0.16 0.06 
Proportion of Homebodies  Looking for material 
security 
0.22 0.05 
Proportion of Dreamers  Looking for happiness 0.08 0.05 
Proportion of Adventurers  Following passion 0.13 0.05 





Proportion of Organics  Searching for 
sustainability and self- 
actualization
0.06 0.05 
Proportion of Rational/Realists  Valuing hard work and 
responsibility 
0.12 0.05 




 * Chosen as the base group in analysis. 
Having the rich demographics information of the households allows us 
to incorporate the heterogeneity across neighborhoods into the adoption model, 
which is shown to be important in studying the diffusion of new products.   
5- RESULTS 
5-1- Full Structural Model 
 
As households in my model are forward-looking, I needed to solve for the 
value functions before being able to derive the adoption probabilities and 
27 
 
substitute them into the likelihood function. I formulate a finite-horizon 
dynamic programing problem31 with 10 years ahead as the terminal stage. The 
corresponding values were calculated for each household at each time. The 
conventional discount factor of 0.95 was used for the backward induction 
algorithm. The exact details of the procedure used are given in the Appendix 2.  
I have estimated the model using household-level adoption data over the 
period of 2002-2010, supplemented with the demographics data at the 
neighborhood level. As the model incorporates individual and observational 
learning, I needed to use simulation-based estimation methods. The random 
draws were taken from the normal and beta distributions and supplemented 
into the model to generate the evolution of beliefs about the adoption payoff 
for each household across time. I used the Simulated Maximum Likelihood 
Estimator. I have used a bunch of demographics variables to capture the 
heterogeneity among the households. For ߠ (i.e. propensity to the adoption 
payoff), I have chosen the demographics which may influence the importance 
of adoption in lieu of the financial payoff. Average income and the socio-
behavioral attributes (i.e. lifestyle segments in my study) seem to be suitable 
alternatives. For ߙ (i.e. General perception of the solar technology), I have 
chosen another set of demographics which are mostly related to the 
neighborhood characteristics. Percentage of single and married (with and 
without children) households as well as the percentage of residential and 
commercial buildings in the neighborhood were chosen.  Given the richness of 
the data, the number of observations, and the complexity of the model (i.e. 
                                                            
31 It’s to be contrasted with the stationary infinite-horizon dynamic programing 




individual-level, forward-looking, observed heterogeneity for α and θ32, 
uncertainty, observational learning), each round of estimation took a few days 
to converge using the Gauss Optimum package. The estimation results for the 
structural model are given in Table 4. 
Table 4 - Estimation Results (Full Structural Model) 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Average Alpha (ߙത)      ‐0.21*  0.03 
Percentage of Families with Children (ߙଵ) 0.00  0.04 
Percentage of Families without Children (ߙଶ) 0.06 0.04 
Percentage of Residential Buildings (ߙଷ)  ‐0.16*  0.04 
True Quality (q) 0.26*  0.00 
Signal Noise (σୱଶ) 2.53*  0.22 
Average Theta (̅ߠ)  2.47    7.19  
Average Income (ߠଵ)  6.72*    2.78  
Percentage of Homebodies (ߠଶ)   49.23*     9.98 
Percentage of Dreamers (ߠଷ)   42.31*     7.91  
Percentage of Adventurers (ߠସ)   47.81*    7.25  
Percentage of Open-minded (ߠହ)   45.11*     7.17  
Percentage of Organics (ߠ଺)   36.92*     9.61  
Percentage of Rationales (ߠ଻)   42.37*     9.04  





32 ߠ௜ ൌ 	ߠ	ഥ൅	ߠଵܣݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁ܫ݊ܿ݋݉݁௜ ൅ ߠଶܲ݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐܱ݂ܽ݃݁ܪ݋ܾ݉݁݋݀݅݁ݏ௜ ൅ߠଷܲ݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐܱ݂ܽ݃݁ܦݎ݁ܽ݉݁ݎ௜ାߠସܲ݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐܱ݂ܽ݃݁ܣ݀ݒ݁݊ݐݑݎ݁ݎݏ௜൅ߠହܲ݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐܱ݂ܱܽ݃݁݌݁݊ܯ݅݊݀݁݀௜ ൅ߠ଺ܲ݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐܱ݂ܱܽ݃݁ݎ݃ܽ݊݅ܿݏ௜ ൅ ߠ଻ܲ݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐܱ݂ܴܽ݃݁ܽݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ௜ ൅ߠ଼ܲ݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐܱ݂ܽ݃݁ܦ݁݉ܽ݊݀݅݊݃௜                ߙ௜ ൌߙത ൅ ߙଵܲ݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐܱ݂ܽ݃݁ܨ݈ܽ݉݅݅݁ݏܹ݅ݐ݄ܥ݄݈݅݀ݎ݁݊௜ ൅ߙଶܲ݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐܱ݂ܽ݃݁ܨ݈ܽ݉݅݅݁ݏܹ݅ݐ݄݋ݑݐܥ݄݈݅݀ݎ݁݊௜ାߙଷܲ݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐܱ݂ܴܽ݃݁݁ݏ݅݀݁݊ݐ݈݅ܽ	ܤݑ݈݅݀݅݊݃ݏ௜    
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From the results in Table 4, we can see that the true quality is significant 
and is 0.26. This means that households scale down the average payoff to 
almost a quarter of its value in their own beliefs; thus for a new technology 
such as solar PV panels the payoff information given by marketers can be 
scaled down significantly. Signal noise is also significant and is high. This 
shows the diversity of initial beliefs over the payoff of solar PV panels among 
the population; it makes sense for a new technology where the perceptions are 
heterogeneous initially.  
 ߙത is negative and significant which means that on average households 
have negative view on the performance of solar panels; this can be true for all 
the new technologies in their initial diffusion phases. This can also be 
interpreted as on average households having low environmental or 
sustainability concerns as opposed to the economic concerns. ߙଵ and ߙଶ are 
insignificant which means that Compared to the singles, the families don’t 
have much different attitudes to the solar PV technology. ߙଷ is negative and 
significant. In other words, households in the neighborhoods with more 
residential buildings (in contrast to the areas with higher commercial buildings) 
have lower perception on the solar technology or have lower sustainability 
concerns. This might be explained by looking deeper at the distinction 
between these two types of urban settings in Germany (i.e. the difference 
between demographic profiles like their income or education).    
̅ߠ, the intercept for the propensity to the net investment payoff, is positive 
but insignificant. ߠଵ, the effect of income on the propensity to the investment 
payoff is positive and significant; it means that households with higher income 
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attach more weight to the net payoff. This might be attributed to the higher 
education of the households with higher income. Looking at it differently, if 
the net payoff is positive households with higher income may adopt earlier and 
if the payoff is negative they may delay the adoption.  
Looking at the coefficients of lifestyle segments33, ߠଶto ߠ଼, we can see all 
of the coefficients have positive and significant values. Since I have chosen 
“settled” as the base lifestyle variable, we can say that compared to the settled 
segment the rest attach more weight to the net payoff of the solar panel 
investment. Looking deeper into at the coefficients, we can see that the 
Demanding segment has the highest propensity to the payoff while the 
Organics have the lowest and all other segments are falling somewhere in 
between. In the initial stages of product definition where the price is high and 
thus the NPV of investment is negative, the Organics are more likely to adopt. 
In other words, early adopters of solar PV technology are mostly among those 
with Organics lifestyle or similar ones like Open-Minded and Dreamers. Once 
the price goes down and the NPV of the investment increases sufficiently, 
we’ll see more adoptions form other segments depending on their profile. The 
Demanding households tend to be among those adopting later (i.e. the late 
adopters are mostly from the Demanding segments). The coefficient estimates 





33 The definition of the lifestyle segments are given in table 3.  
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5-2- Reduced-From Model (No Uncertainty and No Forward Looking) 
 
Modeling the adoption decisions without incorporating the payoff uncertainty 
and forward looking behavior, would result in biased estimates. This could 
eventually lead to inaccurate recommendations to the policy makers. To check 
this, I have estimated a benchmark adoption model without forward looking 
and payoff uncertainty (i.e. Q୧୲ was set to 1 in equation 1). Table 5 shows the 
estimates: 
Table 5 - Estimation Results (Reduced-Form Model) 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Average Alpha (ߙത) ‐1.45*  0.03 
Percentage of Families with Children (ߙଵ) 0.01 0.04 
Percentage of Families without Children (ߙଶ) 0.01  0.04 
Percentage of Residential Buildings (ߙଷ)  ‐0.09*  0.04 
Average Theta (̅ߠ) 66.93* 8.04* 
Average Income (ߠଵ) 3.19 3.14 
Percentage of Homebodies (ߠଶ) ‐30.97*  10.84 
Percentage of Dreamers (ߠଷ) ‐22.17*  8.66 
Percentage of Adventurers (ߠସ)  ‐25.94*  9.50 
Percentage of Open-minded (ߠହ) ‐7.58  11.05 
Percentage of Organics (ߠ଺) ‐15.01 10.15 
Percentage of Rational (ߠ଻) ‐18.05  9.47 
Percentage of Demanding (ߠ଼) ‐23.88  12.24 
Log Likelihood ‐ 29391.69
AIC 58809.38
Looking at the estimation results of the reduced-form model with no 
uncertainty and forward looking, and comparing them to those of the full 
structural model in Table 4, we can see that there are significant changes in 
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sign and magnitude of the coefficients. The magnitude of ߙത is almost eight 
time of the same variable in table 4.  The magnitude of the ̅ߠ in the benchmark 
model is almost thirty times that of the full model. On the other hand, the 
effect of income on ߠ is insignificant. Moreover, we can see that the sign of 
lifestyle segments is negative, which is opposite the full structural model. 
These drastic changes in ߠ may be the result of omitting the uncertain element, 
Q୧୲ , from the equation.  
Looking at the fit of the two models, we see that the full structural model 
outperforms the reduced-form model both in terms of log likelihood and AIC. 
This is due to the fact that uncertainty plays a significant role in adoption of 
new technologies and specifically in the case of solar PV panels. Thus it’s 
important to properly incorporate learning mechanisms (both individual and 
social) into the micromodels of new technology adoption.   
 
5-3- Learning (Evolution of Beliefs) 
 
I have structurally incorporated the observational learning mechanism into the 
diffusion framework. While the estimated parameters in Tables 4 show the 
significance of the true quality and signal noise, we can’t see how 
observational learning works by looking at the estimates. To inform the policy 
decisions, we may need to look at the evolution of households’ beliefs (of the 
investment payoff34) over time in different regions. To demonstrate the power 
of my proposed framework in explaining the underlying adoption mechanisms, 
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I have selected few individual households and have plotted their payoff beliefs 









Figure 3 shows the belief evolution for a sampled household across 
time. We can see that its belief decreases gradually as time goes by, since the 
number of adoptions it observes over time is zero from 2002 to 2004. 







Figure 3 - Evolution of Belief (Constant/Declining Case) 




Figure 4 shows that the belief increases over time when a household 
observes the adoption decisions by its neighbors along the way. In this figure, 
there is one adoption in 2002 and the next ones take place in 2005 and 2006. 
Therefore we can see that the belief increases by more than two times from the 
2002 to 2006.  
Figures 3 and 4 depict the importance of accounting for observational 
learning in order to be able to explain the evolution of beliefs and 
consequently adoption decisions of households in different neighborhoods 
across time. This is indeed an important factor in explaining why some 
households adopt earlier than the others in contexts where the choices are 
observable by others. The in-depth insights generated can support designing 
incentive policies to cater to the heterogeneous population.    
 
5-4- Policy Experiments 
 
Having estimated the structural parameters of the adoption model, I am able to 
run policy experiments. This allows me to investigate the effect of 
governmental incentive policies on the adoption of the solar PV panels. 
Moreover I can also investigate the impact of the information spillover in the 





5-4-1- Seeding  
 
Seeding is an established marketing strategy in which marketers give 
trial samples of the new product to a group of consumers in order to trigger the 
diffusion process via social learning. This strategy has been documented in the 
literature long time back (e.g. Arndt (1967)) and has been revisited over time 
(e.g. Libai (2005)).  Seeding strategy can be of special interest to the policy 
makers for the solar PV market where uncertainty and observational learning 
play role.  
I run a simple seeding policy experiment in which the government is 
giving away a free solar panel to each neighborhood in 2002. In total, 7338 
additional solar PV installations35 take place in this scenario. I then investigate 
the incremental number of installations, due to observational learning, from 
2003 to 2010 as the result of such incentive scheme.   
To show this, I need to re-run the full structural model with the 
additional 7338 adoptions (equally spread across neighborhoods) in 2002. 
Then the estimates were contrasted to the status quo policy to calculate the 
incremental installations in each year36. The results are shown in Table 6. 
  
Table 6 - Policy Experiment 1:  Seeding One Solar PV Panel in Each 
Neighborhood 
Year Incremental Adoptions (Compared to Status Quo) 
 2002  7338 
                                                            
35 There are 7338 distinct neighborhoods in my dataset and with a free solar panel to 
each neighborhood, there would be additional 7338 adoptions in 2002. 
36 We assume that the seeding is an exogenous process and thus doesn’t affect the 
forward looking behavior of the dynamic model.  
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 2003  31 
 2004  46 
 2005  46 
 2006  35 
 2007  29 
 2008  18 
 2009  8 
 2010  2 




From Table 6, we can see that the seeding policy has resulted in 7338 
additional solar PV panel installations in 2002 directly. More interestingly, 
due to the observational learning across different neighborhoods, there were 
additional installations after 2002. Adding up incremental adoptions from 
2003 to 2010, the total adds up to 215 which can be attributed to the 
observational learning.  The cost of running this seeding policy would be 
roughly around 227 million Euros37.  
5-4-2- Subsidy  
 
Subsidizing the price of the solar PV panels for early adopters is a popular 
incentive policy practiced among the policy makers globally. The objective is 
to make the solar PV technology more affordable such that more people adopt 
it in early stages and help kicking off the diffusion faster.  
                                                            
37 It is calculated based on the average panel size in 2002 (6.08 KWp) and the average 
cost of the panels in 2002 (5100Euros/KWp). 
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To demonstrate how this scheme works, I run an experiment in which 
the government subsidizes 50 percent of the cost of solar PV panels for 
adopters in 2002. As the results, based on the utility in (8), there would be 
1501 additional adoptions in 2002 across the neighborhoods. Similar to what 
was done in the previous experiment, I can also show the incremental number 
of adoptions in post 2002 as the results of the one shot policy change in 2002. 
The results are shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7- Policy Experiment 2:  Subsidizing 50 Percent the Installation Cost of 
Solar Panels in 2002 
Year Incremental Adoptions (Compared to Status Quo) 
 2002  1501 
 2003  5 
 2004  8 
 2005  9 
 2006  7 
 2007  6 
 2008  5 
 2009  3 
 2010  2 
 Total  1501 (in 2002) + 45 (from 2003-2010) 
 
 
From Table 7, we can see that the subsidy policy has resulted in 45 
additional adoptions from 2003 to 2010 which can be attributed to the 
observational learning in the neighborhoods.  The cost of running this subsidy 
policy would be roughly around 32 million Euros. 
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5-4-3- Feed-in Tariff  
 
Apart from the price of solar PV panels, Feed-in Tariff rate is an important 
aspect which affects the investment return through the future revenues from 
selling solar generated electricity to the grid. From this angel, FIT rate can be 
a policy instrument itself. European policy makers in the renewable energy 
field have leveraged the FIT rate over the past two decades in order to adjust 
the diffusion of renewable energy especially the solar PV. There are still hot 
debates among European Economists and Environmentalist on the right FIT 
rate.  
To demonstrate how this scheme works, I run an experiment in which 
the government increases the FIT rate by 100% for the adopters of solar PV 
panels in 2002. Consequently there would be 432 additional adoptions in 2002 
across the neighborhoods just because of the new FIT rate. I can also 
demonstrate the effect of observational learning through the incremental 
number of installations post 2002. The results are shown in Table 8. 
 
Table 8- Policy Experiment 3:  Increasing the FIT rate for the adopters of 
Solar Panels in 2002 
Year Incremental Adoptions (Compared to Status Quo) 
 2002  432 
 2003  1 
 2004  3 
 2005  3 
 2006  2 
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 2007  1 
 2008  1 
 2009  1 
 2010  1 
 Total  432 (in 2002) + 13 (from 2003-2010) 
 
 
From Table 8, we can see that the subsidy policy has only resulted in 
13 additional adoptions from 2003 to 2010.  The cost of running this subsidy 
policy would be roughly around 38 million Euros.  
By comparing the subsidy and FIT as the two common incentive 
policy instruments, we can see that subsidizing the price of solar PV panels in 
early years is far more effective and less costly at the same time. This can be 
due to the asymmetric roles of investment cost and return on the adoption 
decisions. Coupled with uncertainty, this can be an interesting area for further 
investigation in the future research. Moreover it seems that subsidy is also 
more efficient than the seeding policy. But this needs to be further investigated 
as per different seeding policies (e.g. giving free samples to all neighborhoods 
or only to the targeted ones).  
This section also highlights the importance of the information spill 
over through observational learning on the diffusion pattern. Thus it would be 
important for the policy makers in the renewable energy market to measure the 
impact of observational learning and to leverage it in determining the timing 
of introducing the incentive policies. As shown in the three policy experiments, 
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this can have substantial financial implications for the policy makers in the 
solar energy field.  
6- CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper I studied the adoption of solar PV panels by households. I used a 
micromodel to shed light on the underlying adoption mechanisms and to 
explain why some households adopt earlier than others. I modeled solar panel 
adoption as investment problem by forward-looking households (or electricity 
producers so to say) in a technology with uncertain payoff. Using the visibility 
of rooftop solar panels from outside, I incorporated observational learning as 
the main mechanism to reduce the inherent uncertainty in adoption payoff. I 
estimated the model using household-level data of the solar panel adoptions in 
Germany augmented with the demographics data at neighborhood-level. I 
showed that uncertainty plays an important role in explaining the diffusion of 
solar panels. Moreover, not incorporating a proper social learning framework 
to the diffusion models of solar PV panels (and to the new technologies in 
general) would result in biased results.  
I contribute to the durable goods adoption literature by casting the new 
technology adoption as a micromodel of investment with uncertain payoff 
incorporating heterogeneity, forward looking, and individual/observational 
learning. I demonstrated the strength of the proposed structural model in 
showing the evolution of beliefs for each household over time and thus 
explaining the underlying adoption mechanism. These could not be achieved 
by the aggregate diffusion models (even by the earlier micromodels in the 
41 
 
literature discussed). The parsimony of the proposed framework makes it 
adaptable to other new technology contexts with minor modification.    
Estimating the parameters of the structural adoption model has allowed 
me to run policy experiments to show the effect of governmental incentive 
instruments on the diffusion. I was interested to show how seeding, subsidy, 
and FIT instruments work as incentive policies. I tried to demonstrate that 
observational learning can be leverage in designing the incentive policies. 
Moreover, the timing and the breadth of implementation for such policies can 
be improved using my proposed model.   
The implementation of incentive policies to boost the diffusion of solar 
PV panels can put a heavy financial burden on governments.  Germany has 
become a case of success and is currently number one globally in terms of the 
share of solar energy. Despite this, German government has received lots of 
criticisms for the amount of money it has allocated to the renewable energy 
incentive policies including its generous federal-level Feed-in Tariff rates. 
Adding to the debate, other countries like Spain have followed the German 
way and ended up unable to pay the huge tariff deficit to the solar PV 
adopters38.  Therefore it’s becoming imperative for the policy makers to be 
able to understand the effect of incentive policies on diffusion pattern 
beforehand so that they design the policies sound and spend the tax payers’ 
money wisely. Looking at the ambitious targets set by big emerging 
economies like India and the early debates around it can underline the 
                                                            





implications of diligence in making such policy decisions39. The proposed 
model in this thesis may be of special interest to the policy makers in the solar 
PV market. The framework presented can be adapted to various sustainable 
technologies in different political contexts. 
However, this thesis has several limitations. Firstly, the data used 
didn’t cover the household-level information for the non-adopters. All the 
households in my data ultimately have adopted the solar PV panels in the 
course of my study. Thus my estimates can be interpreted as the timing of 
adoption (i.e. adopt now or delay) rather than the broader decision to adopt or 
not. This is a common problem with most of the aggregate and even 
micromodels of adoption. Secondly, I did not have access to the electricity 
usage data of the households in my data set. This prevents me from looking at 
the difference of the electricity bill before and after adoption of solar PV 
panels which is an interesting research problem itself.  Thirdly, the 
demographics data used were at neighborhood-level. Having finer 
demographic measures at household-level would add to the power of the 
estimates and might bring in new insights. Having finer data on measures such 
as political affiliation of the households and their past adoption of other green 
initiatives would add to the identification power of the estimates and to the 
richness of the insights. Finally, I had to assume that all the households in the 
market were aware of the benefits of the solar PV technology and their initial 
perceptions were similar. The awareness and perceptions can be affected by 
many factors including the local and federal advertisement campaigns for solar 
                                                            






PV technology. This can bring another layer of heterogeneity to the model and 



























1- Feed-in Tariff Policy in Germany 
 
Feed-in Tariff (FIT) is a subsidy policy under which utilities or grid operators 
are obliged to accept and remunerate the feed-in of green electricity at a 
predetermined rate. The electricity may be produced by households or firms.  
Different tariff rates are typically set for different renewable energy 
technologies to compensate for their lack of cost effectiveness (i.e. their higher 
cost compared to conventional energy sources). The first form of feed-in tariff 
was implemented in the USA in 1978 following the energy crisis.  
Germany has gone through different phases in which different incentive 
policies have been implemented to support the adoption of solar panels.  
In 1990s, 1000 Roofs Program (a joint federal-state program) was 
implemented to assess the potential of solar PV. It was targeted for the below 
5 KWp capacities and subsidized 70% of investment cost with an upper limit 
of DM 27000 per KWp. This policy ended in 1995 with 4000 adoptions. 
Later on, Feed-In Law (StrEG) introduced which mandated the purchase 
of solar energy by utilities at 90% of average electricity price. It was supported 
by all parties while being objected by the utility companies.  
In 1998, the Green Party entered the ruling coalition in federal government 
and at the same time the Germany energy market was liberalized. The 
incentive policy in place currently was incepted in 2000. Renewable Energy 
Act (EEG) was passed in April 2000 which guaranteed a fixed feed-in tariff 
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criticized for the economic burden it has put on the German economy and 
whether there could have been better ways of achieving environmental targets.  
 
2- Dynamic Programming Problem 
 
The adoption of solar panels is a one-time investment decision facing the 
households which makes the dynamic setting similar to the optimal stopping 
problems. Therefor I can cast the solar panel adoption into the finite horizon 
optimal stopping problem (i.e. the problem stops once each household adopts). 
The mathematical representation of the investment decision for household i at 
time t is as follows: 
ቐ
Adopt		if	ሺstopሻ:	ߙ݅ ൅	θ௜൫	ܲ పܸ௧തതതതതω୲୧ െ	p୧୲൯ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 	൒ β ∗ Eሺ ௜ܸ௧ାଵ| ௜ܵ௧ሻ
Wait	if:																		ߙ݅ ൅	θ௜൫	ܲ పܸ௧തതതതതω୲୧ െ	p୧୲൯ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 	൑ β ∗ Eሺ ௜ܸ௧ାଵ| ௜ܵ௧ሻ
           
                                                                                                           (A1)                                         
To solve the problem, I need to solve for the expected value function 
Eሺ ௜ܸ௧ାଵ| ௜ܵ௧ሻ (i.e. expected value of delaying the adoption). The value function 
is maximum utility one can gain if he takes optimal decisions in the future (i.e. 
the option value waiting in the investment problems). It is a function of the 
current state ௜ܵ௧ . I have four state variables in my model; two observable 
variables (p୧୲,	ܲ పܸ௧തതതതത ) and two unobservable variables (ω୲୧ , ߝ௜௧). I need to know 
how each state variable evolves over time in order to get the expectation of the 
value function. For tractability, I assume that the belief over the payoff (ω୲୧) 
remains the same as one looks into the future (one can’t predict the behavior 
of others perfectly to know how it will affect his own belief). In other words, 
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each household keeps its status quo belief when it considers how the world 
will look like in the future. As in extant dynamic models literature, I assume 
that the random shocks (ߝ௜௧) are IID and independent from other state variables. 
In other words, I use the conditional independence assumption in the literature. 
  I assume that each household at each time forms rational expectation over 
price (p୧୲) and average payoff (ܲ పܸ௧തതതതത) given all the historic data points up to t 
(this looks as if instead of the two state variables, I have time as the single 
state which makes the estimation much easier). This makes sense intuitively as 
we usually use the observed values from the past to construct our belief for the 
future. This also brings another dimension of temporal heterogeneity to the 
model. Therefore, I have used the observed price and payoff values by the 
households up to time t to extrapolate the future trends for them using time 
series regression. The data covers 2000 to 2010 (I have augmented the historic 
data from 2000 and 2001 to my data set) and I have extrapolated 10-year 
ahead of the state variables at each t (e.g.  2003-2012 for t=2002 and 2004-





























Price Payoff Price Payoff Price Payoff Price Payoff Price Payoff Price Payoff Price Payoff Price Payoff Price Payoff 
2000 7000 6673.35 7000 6673.35 7000 6673.35 7000 6673.35 7000 6673.35 7000 6673.35 7000 6673.35 7000 6673.35 7000 6673.35 
2001 6500 6673.35 6500 6673.35 6500 6673.35 6500 6673.35 6500 6673.35 6500 6673.35 6500 6673.35 6500 6673.35 6500 6673.35 
2002 5100 6280.8 5100 6280.8 5100 6280.8 5100 6280.8 5100 6280.8 5100 6280.8 5100 6280.8 5100 6280.8 5100 6280.8 
2003 4300 6166.667 4900 6019.1 4900 6019.1 4900 6019.1 4900 6019.1 4900 6019.1 4900 6019.1 4900 6019.1 4900 6019.1 
2004 3350 5970.4 3950 5821.477 5800 7510.79 5800 7510.79 5800 7510.79 5800 7510.79 5800 7510.79 5800 7510.79 5800 7510.79 
2005 2400 5774.133 3180 5585.947 4660 6936.98 5400 7135.251 5400 7135.251 5400 7135.251 5400 7135.251 5400 7135.251 5400 7135.251 
2006 1450 5577.867 2410 5350.416 4260 7039.043 4752.784 7171.069 5100 6778.488 5100 6778.488 5100 6778.488 5100 6778.488 5100 6778.488 
2007 500 5381.6 1640 5114.885 3860 7141.105 4458.498 7301.359 4656.899 7075.964 4400 6439.56 4400 6439.56 4400 6439.56 4400 6439.56 
2008 -450 5185.333 870 4879.355 3460 7243.168 4164.212 7431.648 4399.756 7164.149 4272.332 6845.195 4260 6117.591 4260 6117.591 4260 6117.591 
2009 -1400 4989.067 100 4643.824 3060 7345.231 3869.926 7561.937 4142.613 7252.335 3993.761 6880.244 3988.403 6557.601 3500 5626.55 3500 5626.55 
2010 -2350 4792.8 -670 4408.293 2660 7447.293 3575.64 7692.227 3885.47 7340.52 3715.19 6915.293 3709.07 6544.053 3514.11 6172.667 2800 5120.161 
2011 -3300 4596.533 -1440 4172.763 2260 7549.356 3281.354 7822.516 3628.327 7428.705 3436.619 6950.343 3429.737 6530.505 3208.171 6108.333 2947.296 5726.325 
2012 -4250 4400.267 -2210 3937.232 1860 7651.419 2987.068 7952.805 3371.184 7516.891 3158.048 6985.392 3150.404 6516.957 2902.232 6044 2608.932 5614.197 
2013 -2980 3701.701 1460 7753.481 2692.782 8083.095 3114.041 7605.076 2879.477 7020.441 2871.071 6503.409 2596.293 5979.667 2270.568 5502.069 
2014 1060 7855.544 2398.496 8213.384 2856.898 7693.261 2600.906 7055.491 2591.738 6489.861 2290.354 5915.333 1932.204 5389.941 
2015 2104.21 8343.673 2599.755 7781.447 2322.335 7090.54 2312.405 6476.313 1984.415 5851 1593.84 5277.813 
2016 2342.612 7869.632 2043.764 7125.589 2033.072 6462.765 1678.476 5786.667 1255.476 5165.685 
2017 1765.193 7160.639 1753.739 6449.217 1372.537 5722.333 917.112 5053.557 
2018 1474.406 6435.669 1066.598 5658 578.748 4941.429 
2019 760.659 5593.667 240.384 4829.301 
2020 -97.98 4717.173 
Notes The red colored years are for the states after the data points in the forward looking model. 




The conventional algorithm to solve the finite horizon dynamic 
programing problem is backward induction. In this algorithm, a terminal stage 
is assumed when the problem can’t go beyond then. In my setting, T=t+10 is 
assumed to be the terminal stage. I start from the terminal point: 
ቐ
Adopt ∶ 														 U୧୘ ൌ ߙ݅ ൅	θ௜൫	ܲ ప்ܸതതതതതതω୘୧ െ	p୧୘൯ ൅ ߝ௜்							
Donᇱt	adopt:						U୧୘ ൌ ߝ௜଴்																																																									
    (A2)               
The optimal decision would results in the expected value function for T=t+10: 
 		ܧሺ ௜்ܸ| ௜்ܵିଵሻ ൌ max௔ௗ௢௣௧,ௗ௢௡ᇱ௧ 	Eሼߙ݅ ൅	θ௜൫	ܲ ప்ܸതതതതതതω୘୧ െ	p୧୘൯ ൅ ߝ௜்		, ߝ௜଴்ሽ	                
                                                                                                                 (A3) 
Going backward one period, we have: 
 
ቐ
Adopt ∶ 														 U୧୘ିଵ ൌ ߙ݅ ൅	θ௜൫	ܲ ప்ܸିଵതതതതതതതതതω୘ିଵ୧ െ	p୧୘ିଵ൯ ൅ ߝ௜்ିଵ							
Donᇱt	adopt:						U୧୘ିଵ ൌ β ∗ ܧሺ ௜்ܸ| ௜்ܵିଵሻ																																																		
        
                                                                                                                (A4) 
Which can be solved similarly to have the EሺV୧୘ିଵ|S୧୘ିଶሻ.I repeat the same 
procedure 10 times to ultimately solve for the expected value function in 
t+1,	EሺV୧୲ାଵ|S୧୲ሻ  ,  which is needed to calculate the adoption probability in 
time t as in equation (9).  
 
3- Inference from Observation 
 




ߙ௞ ൅	θ݇൫	ܸܲ݇ݐതതതതതߛ݇ݐ െ 	pkt൯ ൅ ߝ݇ݐ                                                           (A5)       
Where  γ୩୲ is the mean belief across the neighborhood k in time t and is what 
one infers about the investment payoff by observing the adoption pattern at 
neighborhood k at time t. Given the normality assumption for the random 
shock, the probability of adoption by an average household in neighborhood k 
would be40:  
1 െ CDF	ሺെߙ݇ ൅ θ௞ ∗ p୩ଵ െ θ௞	ܲ ௞ܸ௧തതതതതതߛ௞௧ሻ								                                (A6)                                        
In this equation, the assumption is that by knowing γ୩୲ we can solve for the 
probability of adoption for neighborhood k at time t. On the other hand from 
the Frequentist approach to probability, we may substitute probability with the 
ratio (i.e. proportion of households adopted or acceptance rate in 
neighborhood k at time t).  
The reverse is also true; by observing the acceptance rate in neighborhood k 
at time t , ܣܿܿ݁݌ݐܴܽ݊ܿ݁ܽݐ݁෣ ௞௧, one knows the probability of adoption at the 
neighborhood level. We equate the acceptance rate to (A6): 
ܣܿܿ݁݌ݐܴܽ݊ܿ݁ܽݐ݁෣ ௞௧ ൌ 1 െ CDF	ሺെߙ݇ ൅ θ௞ ∗ p୩ଵ െ θ௞	ܲ ௞ܸ௧തതതതതതߛ௞௧ሻ    (A7) 
Since Normal is a symmetric distribution, we can have: 
ܣܿܿ݁݌ݐܴܽ݊ܿ݁ܽݐ݁෣ ௞௧ ൌ CDF	ሺߙ݇ െ θ௞ ∗ p୩ଵ ൅ θ௞	ܲ ௞ܸ௧തതതതതതߛ௞௧ሻ              (A8) 
We can take inverse Normal CDF of the both sides: 
ܫ݊ݒ݁ݎݏ݁ܥܦܨ൫ܣܿܿ݁݌ݐܴܽ݊ܿ݁ܽݐ݁෣ ௞,௧൯ ൌ ߙ݇ െ θ௞ ∗ p୩ଵ ൅ θ௞	ܲ ௞ܸ௧തതതതതതߛ௞௧    (A9) 
                                                            




By using (A9), she can solve for the mean belief:   
ߛ௞௧ ൌ ሺ൫ܫ݊ݒ݁ݎݏ݁ܥܦܨ൫ܣܿܿ݁݌ݐܴܽ݊ܿ݁ܽݐ݁
෣ ௞,௧൯ െ ߙ݇ ൅ θ௞ ∗ p୩୲൯ሻ θ௞ ∗ 	ܲ ௞ܸ௧തതതതതത൘          
                                                                                                                 (A10) 
 
4- Social Learning Evidence 
 
By looking at Figure 2 we could see that some adoption clusters were being 
formed over time. This means that previous solar PV installations may have 
positive impact on the probability new installations as can be seen from the 
spatial pattern of adoptions. To further test this, and before estimating the full 




                                                                                                                 (A11) 
Where the left hand side measures the probability of adoption by household i 
at time t as a function of price of the solar PV panels, Feed-in Tariff, number 
of installations in the last period, and cumulative number of installations. The 
parameters to be estimated are a, b, c, and d respectively. I use data from 2004 
to 2007 (around 8000 installations) to estimate the model. The estimation 





Table 10 - Estimation Results (Binary Logit Model of Adoption) 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
ܽ -.973* .004 
ܾ .191* .005 
ܿ .231* .003 
݀ .016* .000 
 
From Table 10 we can see that all of the coefficients are significant. The 
coefficient for price, ܽ, is negative and the coefficient for FIT, ܾ,  is positive as 
expected. Related to learning, we can see that the coefficient for cumulative 
installations is positive even after controlling for the installations in the 
previous period. This shows that the main effect (i.e. effect of past adoptions) 
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